For the curious, the links below may prove interesting.
[CV]
[Statement of research]
[Statement of pedagogy]
Publications, with links when available:
- Factitious Virtue (under contract with Cambridge University Press)
A book that developed out of my dissertation. The main thrust of the argument is that even if the so-called situationist challenge to virtue ethics is successful, it still makes sense to attribute virtues on pragmatic grounds because such attributions function as self-fulfilling prophecies. (note that 'factitious' is a word; it means artificial)
- Extending the situationist challenge to responsibilist virtue epistemology (forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly)
In this paper I argue that the situationist challenge extends to responsibilist virtue epistemology. Without jargon, that basically means that most people aren't curious, open-minded, or intellectually courageous as such, but that they may be curious-while-in-a-good-mood, open-minded-while-in-a-good-mood, and intellectually courageous-in-the-face-of-a-non-unanimous-majority.
- The Rum Tum Tugger model: Preference indeterminacy and instability (forthcoming in Synthese)
In this paper I explore evidence for the indeterminacy and instability of preferences. This evidence undermines folk-psychological explanation, decision theoretic explanation, and some theories of rationality. I then articulate a model of preferences that allows for local indeterminacy and instability while preserving as much transitivity as possible.
- The centrality of belief and reflection in Knobe effect cases (forthcoming in The Monist, co-authored with James Beebe & Brian Robinson)
We argue for a unified explanation of all documented Knobe effects based on the automatic processing of exceptions to generalizations. People seem to be hard-wired to notice exceptions, a rational heuristic since ignorance of exceptions can be more harmful than ignorance of generalizations.
- Identifying and defending the hard core of virtue ethics (forthcoming in Journal of Philosophical Research)
In this paper I endeavor to identify the core committments of virtue ethics, which then enables me to adjudicate the so-called situationist challenge to virtue ethics. Although most of the defenses offered to date are inadequate, I point to a couple of promising responses (which I explore in more detail in my book).
- Nietzsche, naturalism, and the tenacity of the intentional (forthcoming in International Studies in Philosophy)
In this paper I argue that Nietzsche held a view I call the tenacity of the intentional, according to which, when a mental state loses its object, the state does not disappear but instead acquires a new object.
- Ambivalence, the self, and ambivalence about the self in Nietzsche (forthcoming in Journal of International and Interdisciplinary Studies)
Nietzsche holds a positive view of selfhood according to which selves are individuated by their bodies. However, both being a self and state-possession admit of degrees: a given person is more fully a self to the extent that her higher-order pro-attitudes endorse her first-order states, and a state is more fully one's own to the extent that one wants to have it and positively evaluates it.
- Explaining away intuitions about traits: Why virtue ethics seems plausible (even if it isn't) (Review of Philosophy of Psychology) I argue that folk intuitions cannot serve as a basis of knowledge about character traits, including the virtues.
- The tenacity of the intentional prior to the Genealogy (Journal of Nietzsche Studies) I trace the development of Nietzsche's conception of the tenacity of the intentional through Nietzsche's early and middle works, arguing along the way that a more nuanced version of the thesis may be true.
- Sensitivity theory and the individuation of belief-formation methods (Erkenntnis)
In this paper I argue that Nozick's sensitivity theory of knowledge is self-contradictory.
- A danger of definition: Polar predicates in moral theory (Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy) In this paper I argue that response-dependence semantics for moral terms like 'good' and 'bad' entails a contradiction because ambivalence leads to some things' being both good and bad.
- Hypothetical intentionalism and statutory interpretation (US-China Law Review) In this paper I make a case for hypothetical intentionalism (a view that divorces the intents of actual legislators from the meaning of legal texts somewhat,
while still falling under a more-or-less Gricean picture of legal language) in legal interpretation.
- Virtues, intelligences, situations (forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
This is a review of two recent books on empirically adequate virtue ethics: Virtue as Social Intelligence by Snow and Practical Intelligence and the Virtues by Russell.
- Revivals of non-cognitivism (Philosophical Forum)
This is a review of Terrence Irwin's monumental The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study. Several dozens people contributed to the review, which spans 67 pages! I handled the part about non-cognitivism in the 20th century.
- The situation of the jury: Bias in the trials of accused serial killers (Philosophy for Everyone -- Serial Killers) This chapter discusses various attribution biases that may play a role in the trials of accused serial killers.